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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

A MISSING MARKET: THE FUTURE OF INTERSTATE EMISSIONS
TRADING PROGRAMS AFTER NORTH CAROLINA v. EPA
INTRODUCTION
The complex nature of air pollution and our constantly developing
understanding of its formation have yielded a complicated and prolonged
challenge in our effort to control it. Pollution is not a local problem: pollutants
emitted from sources in one area frequently react in the atmosphere while
traveling hundreds of miles, ultimately affecting the air quality and health of
communities in different states.1 Referred to as interstate air pollution
transport,2 this phenomenon has provoked widespread debate as to the
mechanisms and governmental bodies best suited to control it.
A considerable obstacle in controlling interstate pollution concerns the
design of the Clean Air Act. The Clean Air Act functions as a system of
cooperative federalism.3 While the federal government, acting through the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), establishes air quality standards that
limit the concentration of pollutants in the ambient air, states are responsible
for implementing the regulation to ensure those limits are met.4 Thus, the
scheme primarily focuses a state’s attention on its own air quality, and does
little to encourage states to minimize air pollution that drifts across state
boundaries.5 Moreover, because a state may only regulate the sources of
pollution located within its jurisdiction, the state has no control over out-ofstate sources emitting air pollutants that contribute to its pollution problems.6
Ineffective attempts by states to control interstate air pollution transport have
consequently led to increased federal and EPA involvement.7

1. See Craig N. Oren, Clean Air and Interstate Transport: Seeing the Big Picture, 10
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 196, 196 (2002) (“[EPA] sets ambient air quality standards at levels that
protect public health and welfare. States must then develop implementation plans that
demonstrate that the levels of the ambient air quality standards will be attained . . . .”).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 196–97.
6. Oren, supra note 1, at 196–97.
7. Id. at 199.
635
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In May 2005, EPA promulgated the Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR) to
address these difficulties.8 Hailed as “the linchpin of EPA’s program to
improve air quality and EPA’s most significant action to protect public health
and the environment since the passage of the 1990 Clean Air Act
Amendments,”9 CAIR was designed to address the ongoing concerns of states
adversely affected by the interstate transport of emissions.10 Specifically,
CAIR aimed to reduce the presence of two criteria pollutants, ozone and fine
particulate matter (PM2.5), in downwind states by requiring certain upwind
states to reduce their emissions of the precursors to such pollutants, namely,
sulfur dioxide (SO2) and nitrogen oxides (NOx).11 EPA included in the rule
cap-and-trade programs, which states subject to CAIR may adopt, in order to
meet the required emissions reductions in a flexible and cost-effective
manner.12 While CAIR limited regional emissions, the cap-and-trade programs
would allow pollution sources, such as power and utility companies, to freely
buy and sell emissions allowances from in-state or out-of-state sources to
achieve the required reductions.13
The cap-and-trade programs included in CAIR were not the first of its
kind; this system has long been recognized as a cost-effective method to
facilitate more substantial emissions reductions.14 In 1990, general acceptance
of an economic approach to air pollution control prompted Congress to grant
EPA the authority to implement an interstate trading program for SO2 as part
of the Title IV Acid Rain Program.15 In the years following the success of the
Acid Rain Program, EPA promulgated interstate emissions trading programs
for other pollutants, including the creation of a NOx cap-and-trade program in
the NOx SIP Call.16 Lacking Title IV’s express authorization and instruction to

8. Rule to Reduce Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter and Ozone: Hearing
Before the Committee on Environment and Public Works Subcommittee on Clean Air and
Nuclear Safety United States Senate, 110th Cong. 1 (2008) (statement of Brian McLean, Director
of Atmospheric Programs Office of Air and Radiation U.S. Environmental Protection Agency),
available at http://epa.gov/airmarkets/testimony.pdf [hereinafter McLean statement].
9. McLean statement, supra note 8, at 3.
10. Id. at 4.
11. Rule to Reduce Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter and Ozone (Clean Air
Interstate Rule); Revisions to Acid Rain Program; Revisions to the NOx SIP Call, 70 Fed. Reg.
25,162 (May 12, 2005) (published in scattered sections of the C.F.R).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See, e.g., Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act, 73 Fed. Reg.
44,354 (July 30, 2008) (discussing a cap and trade program for greenhouse gas emissions).
15. MEG VICTOR, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, RECENT EPA REGULATORY ACTIONS AND
EFFECTS ON NOX CONTROLS 1 (2006), available at http://www.netl.doe.gov/publications/
proceedings/06/ecc/pdfs/Victor_Summary.pdf.
16. Clean Air Interstate Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. at 25,162.
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implement such programs, EPA found implicit authorization pursuant to its
general duty to ensure that states meet specific Clean Air Act requirements.17
In 2000, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia upheld all
significant aspects of EPA’s NOx SIP Call in Michigan v. EPA,18 including
EPA’s controversial decision to base emissions reductions on the costefficiency of those reductions.19 This outcome had important consequences;
many viewed the Michigan decision as an expansion of EPA’s authority to
regulate interstate air pollution.20 In addition, relying heavily on the Michigan
decision, EPA justified much of its methodology in promulgating CAIR’s capand-trade programs by using the same approach adopted in the NOx SIP Call.21
In a unanimous opinion eight years later, the same court in North Carolina v.
EPA22 vacated CAIR in its entirety, finding that EPA’s approach in creating
CAIR’s interstate emissions trading programs was fundamentally flawed.23

17. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D)(i) (2006).
18. 213 F.3d 663 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
19. Id. at 695.
20. Patricia Ross McCubbin, Michigan v. EPA: Interstate Ozone Pollution and EPA’s “NOx
SIP Call,” 20 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 47, 48 (2001) (“[Michigan] will give EPA greater
authority to regulate interstate air pollution in the future . . . .”); Erika Jean Doyle, Michigan v.
United States Environmental Protection Agency: The Power of EPA in Curing the Difficulty
Downwind, 13 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 93, 118 (2002) (“[T]he immediate impact is that EPA’s
authority under section 7410(a)(2)(D)(i)(I) has been greatly expanded . . . .”).
21. Clean Air Interstate Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. at 25,171.
22. 531 F.3d 896 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
23. Id. at 930. In addition to the primary issue discussed in this Article, the North Carolina
court also held against EPA on four issues. First, in promulgating CAIR, EPA ignored “interfere
with maintenance” language in section 110(a)(2)(D)(i)(I) of Clean Air Act (CAA), requiring EPA
to ensure that SIPs contain adequate provisions prohibiting sources within a state from emitting
air pollutants in amounts which will contribute significantly to nonattainment in, or “interfere
with maintenance” by, any other state with respect to any NAAQS. Id. at 908–11. Second, the
2015 Phase Two deadline for upwind states to come into compliance with CAIR was
incompatible with CAA mandate that SIPs contain adequate provisions prohibiting significant
contributions to nonattainment consistent with provisions of Title I. Id. at 911–12. Third,
budgets for sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides trading programs and region-wide cap were
arbitrary and capricious. Id. at 916–21. Fourth, EPA could not attempt to harmonize CAIR’s
regulation of sulfur dioxide with the existing program for trading sulfur dioxide emissions
allowances under Title IV of CAA. Id. at 921–22.
The court agreed with EPA that EPA did not alter the definition of the word “will” in the
phrase “will contribute significantly,” nor did EPA’s interpretation of that term violate CAA, id.
at 913–14, and that EPA did not act arbitrarily when it proposed a PM2.5 contribution threshold of
.15 micrograms per cubic meter but finally settled on a threshold of .2. Id. at 913–16.
With respect to border state issues, the court found that upwind states Texas and Florida
could be included in CAIR, but the state of Minnesota could not. Id. at 923–28.
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The North Carolina decision resulted in tumultuous outcry from
environmental organizations and industrial groups,24 as well as all parties
Widespread concern regarding the adverse
involved in the action.25
implications of the court’s vacatur for public health, the environment, and
regulatory certainty prompted the court to reconsider.26 In response to EPA’s
subsequent petition, the D.C. District Court granted EPA’s request to remand
without vacatur, allowing CAIR to remain in effect until replaced by a rule that
is consistent with the Court’s prior opinion.27 While the Court did not grant an
indefinite stay, it refrained from imposing a schedule by which EPA must
act.28 Although remanding CAIR will temporarily preserve its environmental
values, the North Carolina opinion still puts into question EPA’s authority to
create interstate emissions trading programs.29
This Article evaluates government efforts to regulate interstate air
pollution transport and specifically addresses the use of cap-and-trade
programs as a means to facilitate these types of emissions reductions. It
concludes that the decision in North Carolina v. EPA prevents EPA from
creating interstate emissions trading programs without additional statutory
authority and questions the availability of existing regulation that could
provide authority for such programs. Part I provides information regarding the
nature of air pollution transport and early attempts to control it, followed by an
overview of the Clean Air Act and provisions that address interstate air
pollution transport. Part II explains the general function and benefits of capand-trade programs and describes emissions trading programs preceding
CAIR; this section also discusses an earlier challenge to one of the rules. Part
III lays out the framework of CAIR, providing detailed context for Part IV,
which examines the court’s vacatur of CAIR in North Carolina v. EPA. Part V
analyzes the consequences of the North Carolina decision and briefly
considers alternative opportunities to regulate interstate air pollution transport
through a cap-and-trade system.

24. Felicity Barringer, Decisions Shut Door on Bush Clean-Air Steps, N.Y. TIMES, July 12,
2008, at A1 (“[I]ndustry and lobbyists both expressed concerns about the impact of the court
ruling.”).
25. Id. (“Entergy, one of the companies that brought the case to court, emphasized on
Friday that it did not want the whole rule thrown out . . . .”); McLean statement, supra note 8
(“[T]he court decision to vacate CAIR poses significant concerns in implementing the CAA
provisions. . . . However, we are most concerned about the impacts to public health and welfare
and the environmental damage that could result . . .”).
26. North Carolina v. EPA, 550 F.3d 1176, 1178 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. McLean statement, supra note 8 (“Another concern is the implications of the court
decision on the future of cap-and-trade programs.”).
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I. INTERSTATE AIR POLLUTION TRANSPORT AND THE CLEAN AIR ACT
A.

The Problem of Interstate Air Pollution Transport

Interstate air pollution transport is generally recognized as the damaging
effects of weather patterns that carry pollutants and their precursors downwind,
away from the source responsible for the emissions, only to exacerbate air
pollution problems elsewhere.30 Due to weather patterns, topography, and
concentration of pollution sources east of the Continental Divide, pollution
transport has a greater impact on air quality in Eastern regions than other
areas.31 And, most often, it is the accumulation of emissions from an entire
region that collectively affects a specific area.32 The nature of pollution
formation in the atmosphere and the phenomenon of interstate transport have
resulted in Northeastern States becoming severely burdened by the collective
flow of precursor emissions from upwind sources across a large geographic
area, such as the South and the industrialized areas in the Midwest.33
Certain pollutants are more susceptible to this phenomenon than others.
Interstate transport affects acid rain formation when SO2 and NOx emissions
released from power plants and other sources are blown hundreds of miles
across state and national borders.34 After SO2 and NOx react with water vapor
and other chemicals in the atmosphere to form acidic compounds, the harmful
mixture falls back to earth in the form of precipitation, miles away from where
the precursors were emitted.35 Similarly, ground-level ozone, or smog, occurs
on a regional scale, and is produced in complex chemical reactions when its
precursors, NOx and volatile organic compounds, react in the presence of
sunlight.36 The chemical reactions that create ozone occur when the pollutants
are blown through the air by wind; consequently, the harmful effects of ozone
30. Finding of Significant Contribution and Rulemaking for Certain States in the Ozone
Transport Assessment Group Region for Purposes of Reducing Regional Transport of Ozone, 63
Fed. Reg. 57,356, 57,360 (Oct. 27, 1998) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 72, 75, and 96)
[hereinafter Ozone Transport Assessment Group]. Precursors refer to the chemicals that react to
form the pollutant.
31. Jamie Larmann, Comparing Apples to Oranges? EPA Faces Difficulties in Bringing to
Fruition an Emissions Trading Program for NOx, 6 ENVTL. LAW. 603, 609 (2000).
32. Ozone Transport Assessment Group, 63 Fed. Reg. at 57,375–76.
33. Larmann, supra note 31, at 609.
34. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ACID RAIN HOME PAGE, http://www.epa.gov/
acidrain/what/index.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2010). Although the precursors of acid rain
formation result from both natural sources, such as volcanoes and decaying vegetation, and manmade sources, such as power plants burning coal and heavy oil produce approximately two-thirds
of the annual SO2 emissions in the United States and about one-fourth of NOx emissions. Id.
35. Id. Acid rain causes acidification of lakes and streams and contributes to the damage of
trees at high elevations. Id. In addition, prior to falling to the earth, SO2 and NOx gasses
contribute to visibility degradation and harm public health. Id.
36. Ozone Transport Assessment Group, 63 Fed. Reg. at 57,359.
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can be more severe many miles away from the source of emissions than it is at
the source.37
Also susceptible to interstate air pollution transport is particulate matter, a
chemically and physically diverse mixture of discrete particles and droplets,
existing in a range of particle sizes.38 Fine particulate matter (PM2.5) is created
when its gaseous precursors, SO2, NOx, ammonia, and certain volatile organic
compounds, react in the air to form compounds that absorb water, ultimately
existing as tiny droplets.39 Because of its small size and the process of its
formation, PM2.5 can be created and transported substantial distances from
emissions sources, contributing to health-related problems in other regions.40
Interstate air pollution transport is difficult to regulate on the state level, as
states affected by upwind pollution have little power to restrict the emissions
sources of other states.41 States, EPA, and industry soon recognized that the
problem of interstate pollution transport could not be solved without
coordinated action by government.42 Amendments to the Clean Air Act in
1990 reinforced a general awareness that interstate air pollution transport is a
regional problem requiring a collaborative effort.43 Most notably, Congress
enacted the Title IV Acid Rain Program, recognizing the contribution of
37. Ozone Transport Assessment Group, 63 Fed. Reg. at 57,359. Prolonged exposure to
ozone has been linked to a number of adverse health effects, primarily consisting of
complications due to inflammation and damage to the lining of the lungs, which may ultimately
lead to reductions in lung function. Clean Air Interstate Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. at 25,162, 25,169. In
addition, ozone affects vegetation and ecosystems, leading to decreased agricultural production,
reduced growth and survivability of seedlings, and increased susceptibility of plants to disease,
pests, and other environmental stresses. Id. In long-lived species of plants and trees, these effects
have the potential for long-term and adverse impacts on forest ecosystems. Id.
38. Rule to Reduce Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter and Ozone (Interstate
Quality Rule), 69 Fed. Reg. 4566, 4575 (proposed Jan. 30, 2004).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 4566, 4575. PM2.5 has been associated with a number of serious health effects,
primarily, respiratory illnesses and cardiovascular disease. Clean Air Interstate Rule, 70 Fed.
Reg. at 25,168.
41. State law, of course, only affects the sources located within that state’s jurisdiction.
Even negotiation between states, however, may be ineffective, as upwind states do not suffer the
social costs of pollution and have little incentive to consider the costs of downwind states.
Cristina C. Caplan, The Failure of Current Legal and Regulatory Mechanisms to Control
Interstate Ozone Transport: The Need for New National Legislation, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 169, 202
(2001). Thus, downwind states often find federal environmental laws essential for the protection
of their interests. Id.
42. McLean statement, supra note 8.
43. Ozone Transport Assessment Group, 63 Fed. Reg. 57,356, 57,360. Under the 1990
Amendments, Congress provided states and EPA with the authority to create regional transport
commissions for the purpose of assessing strategies to address interstate air pollution transport,
and directly established a commission of eleven northeastern states to evaluate ozone transport
and propose control measures, the Northeast Ozone Transport Commission (OTC). 42 U.S.C. §
7506a (2006).
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interstate pollution transport to the acid rain problem.44 EPA has also
attempted to regulate interstate air pollution transport on its own initiative,
although the agency’s authority to do so has been questioned.45 Nevertheless,
EPA is responsible for advancing one of the first efforts to obtain
comprehensive information regarding interstate ozone transport, resulting in
the Ozone Transport Assessment Group (OTAG).46
B.

Responsibilities of EPA and States Under the Clean Air Act

The regulatory scheme of the Clean Air Act is based on a concept of
cooperative federalism. Cooperative federalism describes efforts of both
federal government and individual states to work together to focus on meeting
nationwide air quality goals to reduce concentrations of pollutants in the
atmosphere.47 While the federal government identifies the criteria pollutants,48
each state is responsible for assuring air quality within its boundaries.49 For
each criteria pollutant, EPA must prescribe primary and secondary National
Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS), which reflect the maximum
acceptable level of the pollutant in the ambient air.50 Once NAAQS are
44. H.R. REP. No. 101-490, pt. 1, at 480 (1990), reprinted in S. COMM. ON ENV’T AND PUB.
WORKS, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1990, at 3332–34
(1993) [hereinafter HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT].
45. HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT, at 3387–88 (1993) (“It is arguable whether long-range
transport could be adequately addressed by the existing Clean Air Act. The EPA has generally
argued that the Clean Air Act as currently written does not allow for EPA action on long-range
transport.”).
46. See Memorandum from Mary D. Nichols, Assistant Administrator for Air and Radiation,
EPA, to Regional Administrators (Mar. 2, 1995) (discussing the Clean Air Interstate Act)
available at http://www.epa.gov/ttncaaa1/t1/memoranda/mnozone.pdf. In 1995, EPA recognized
that states were unable to manage the problem of interstate air pollution transport effectively and
requested an assessment of the ozone transport phenomenon. Id. This led to the formation of the
Ozone Transport Assessment Group (OTAG), a collaboration among thirty-seven states, EPA,
industrial groups, and environmental organizations to study interstate ozone pollution and
evaluate strategies to reduce its transport from one state to another. Clean Air Interstate Rule, 62
Fed. Reg. 57,362. OTAG generated technical and modeling information on regional ozone
transport, ultimately completing the most extensive analysis of ozone transport ever conducted.
Id.
47. Douglas R. Williams, Cooperative Federalism and the Clean Air Act, 20 ST. LOUIS U.
PUB. L. REV. 67, 74–75 (2001).
48. Criteria pollutants are defined in the Clean Air Act as air pollutants emitted from
“numerous or diverse mobile and stationary sources . . . . which may reasonably be anticipated to
endanger public health.” 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1).
49. 42 U.S.C. § 7407(a).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(a), (b)(1)–(2). Primary standards are set at levels requisite to protect
the public health with an adequate margin of safety, while secondary standards are set at levels to
protect the public welfare from any known or anticipated adverse effects. Id. § 7409. Currently,
EPA has identified the following criteria pollutants: ozone, carbon monoxide, nitrogen dioxide,
sulfur dioxide, particulate matter, and lead. 40 C.F.R. § 50.1 (2009).
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established for criteria pollutants, each state is required to submit State
Implementation Plans (SIPs)51 to EPA for approval,52 specifying the manner in
which the state will achieve the primary and secondary NAAQS within every
air quality control region in the state.53
Designation of air quality control regions according to attainment status is
significant for purposes of developing and carrying out a SIP. EPA typically
consults with state authorities in order to obtain information and identify which
A
air quality control regions are in nonattainment or attainment.54
nonattainment area does not meet NAAQS for a particular pollutant, while an
attainment area does meet the primary or secondary NAAQS for the
pollutant.55 States then develop SIPs to address the requirements specific to
each type of area.56
Each State has the additional responsibility to prevent its emissions from
contributing to the failure of another State to achieve NAAQS under the “Good
Neighbor” provision of the Clean Air Act.57 Congress revised the good
neighbor provision under the 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments to properly
address the problem of interstate air pollution transport, recognizing the
tendency of certain air pollutants to affect air quality in areas hundreds of miles
away from the source.58 In 1990, Congress again strengthened this provision,

51. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1). The general function of SIPs is to provide for the
implementation, maintenance, and enforcement of NAAQS within the state. Id. Among other
specific criteria, SIPs must include emissions limitations and other pollution control measures, as
well as timetables for compliance. Id. § 7410(a)(2)(A).
52. Id. § 7407(a).
53. Id. EPA’s review process begins once it confirms that the SIP includes specific
minimum criteria. Id. § 7410(k)(1)(B). EPA may then approve or disapprove the SIP in part,
fully, or conditionally; or EPA may call for a revision of the plan. Id. § 7410(k)(3). After two
years, if a SIP does not meet the minimum completeness criteria, or the state fails to submit an
approved SIP, EPA is required to promulgate a Federal Implementation Plan (FIP). Id. §
7410(c)(1)(B). In addition, the state is also subject to EPA imposed sanctions under the Clean
Air Act. Id. § 7410(a)(1).
54. Id. § 7407(d)(1)(A).
55. Id. § 7407(d)(1)(A)(i)–(ii). The area may also be considered unclassifiable, which
cannot be classified by the available information as meeting or not meeting the NAAQS of a
pollutant. Id. § 7407(d)(1)(A)(iii).
56. For nonattainment areas, SIPs must provide for implementation of all reasonably
available measures as expeditiously as possible. 42 U.S.C. § 7502(c)(1) (2006). For attainment
areas, SIPs must contain measures necessary to prevent significant deterioration of air quality. Id.
§ 7471.
57. See id. § 7410(a)(D)(i).
58. Ozone Transport Assessment Group, 63 Fed. Reg. 57,356, 57,360. The 1977
amendments replaced section 110(a)(2)(E), which required that SIPs include “measures necessary
to insure that emissions of air pollutants from sources located in any air quality control region
will not interfere with the attainment or maintenance of such primary or secondary standard.”
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 110(a)(2)(E), 84 Stat. 1676, 1681.
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reflecting the general concern that some pollutants are a regional, and not
merely a local problem.59 The current Good Neighbor provision of section
110(a)(2)(D)(i) requires that SIPs:
[C]ontain adequate provisions prohibiting . . . any source or other type of
emissions activity within the State from emitting any air pollutant in amounts
which will—I) contribute significantly to nonattainment in, or interfere with
maintenance by, any other State with respect to any such national primary or
secondary ambient air quality standard, or II) interfere with measures required
to be included in the applicable implementation plan for any other State . . . to
60
prevent significant deterioration of air qualify or to protect visibility.

Consequently, each state must identify its existing emissions sources which
contribute significantly to air pollution outside its boundaries and notify nearby
states.61 A state must also provide written notice of any new sources which
may have the same effect, at least sixty days before construction is to be
permitted by the state.62
Congress also included in the 1977 amendments a process by which
affected states may enforce section 110(a)(2)(D)(1), providing additional
means to address interstate air pollution transport.63 Under section 126(b), an
affected state may petition EPA for a finding that if any source or group of
sources emits any air pollutant in amounts that contribute significantly to
nonattainment in another state, it is in violation of section 110(a)(2)(D)(1).64 If
The 1977 version only allowed EPA to approve a SIP if it contained provisions prohibiting
emissions that would prevent downwind attainment or maintenance of the NAAQS. Clean Air
Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 108(a)(4), 91 Stat. 685, 693.
59. Ozone Transport Assessment Group, 63 Fed. Reg. at 57,360. The 1990 version first
included in the statutory language “contribute[s] significantly,” requiring that states not only
prohibit emissions preventing nonattainment or maintenance, but also those emissions that
contribute significantly to nonattainment or maintenance. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D)(i)(I) (1994).
See Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Interstate Environmental Externalities, 144 U. PA. L.
REV. 2341, 2360–61 (1996) (explaining the 1990 changes to the interstate emissions provisions of
the Clean Air Act).
60. Id. § 7410(a)(2)(D).
61. 42 U.S.C. § 7426(a)(2) (2006).
62. Id. § 7426(a)(1).
63. Ozone Transport Assessment Group, 63 Fed. Reg. at 57,360.
64. 42 U.S.C. § 7426(b). EPA views sections 110 and 126 as complementary and adapted to
achieving different ends. Paul D. Brown, Lofty Goals, Questioned Motives, and Proffered
Justifications: Regional Transport of Ground-Level Ozone and the EPA’s NOx SIP Call, 60 U.
PITT. L. REV. 923, 957 (1999). Section 110 addresses the extent to which the entire emissions
inventory of an upwind state impacts a downwind state’s ability to meet the requirements of the
ozone NAAQS. Id. Once a finding of significant contribution is made, the offending state is free
to choose any combination of measures deemed appropriate to meet the emissions reductions. Id.
On the other hand, section 126(b) petitions are aimed at a particular source or group of sources.
Id. A finding by the EPA that these sources contribute significantly to nonattainment in a nearby
state results in direct controls imposed by EPA against the sources. Id.
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the SIP of the state containing the source does not sufficiently address those
emissions, and EPA makes a finding of significant contribution, EPA may
establish federal emissions limits for those sources.65 EPA may also find, upon
its own initiative, that a SIP is substantially inadequate to mitigate interstate
pollution transport under section 110(k)(5), and require the state to revise and
submit a corrected SIP.66
II. DEVELOPMENT OF EMISSIONS TRADING PROGRAMS
A.

Cap-and-Trade Programs: A Market-Based Approach to Regulating Air
Pollution

Market-based emissions trading systems have proved to be an important
strategy to improve air quality in a cost-effective manner, as pollution control
programs are rarely developed today without including some form of
environmental trading.67 While cap-and-trade systems are not stand-alone
regulation, they are typically included in pollution control rules as a tool for
sources to meet the required emissions limits.68 An efficient cap-and-trade
system results in significant benefits to the environment, human health, and
industry.69 Because firms may integrate compliance planning with investment
cycles and decide which methods and technologies to implement, overall
transaction costs of compliance are greatly reduced.70 The system also
provides economic incentive for industry to devise and implement more costefficient technology to comply with emissions standards.71 Because greater
emissions reductions may be achieved with lower compliance costs, society’s
interest in improving air quality is achieved.72 While emissions trading
programs are not devoid of criticism,73 overall, the cap-and-trade system “has
been an extremely effective mechanism in controlling air pollution.”74

65. Brown, supra note 64, at 957.
66. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(k)(5) (2006).
67. David M. Driesen, Trading and Its Limits, 14 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 169, 169 (2006).
68. Byron Swift, How Environmental Laws Work: An Analysis of the Utility Sector’s
Response to Regulation of Nitrogen Oxides and Sulfur Dioxide Under the Clean Air Act, 14 TUL.
ENVTL. L.J. 309, 390–91 (2001).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Gregory Gotwald, Cap-and-Trade Systems, with or Without New Source Review? An
Analysis of the Proper Statutory Framework for Future Electric Utility Air Pollution Regulation,
28 VT. L. REV. 423, 441 (2004).
72. See Swift, supra note 68, at 347–48.
73. Early attempts to employ market-based strategies for pollution control were not well
received by environmental groups, although the success of the Acid Rain Program largely
reversed any negative sentiment. See Brown, supra note 64, at 966–67; Byron Swift, U.S.
Emissions Trading: Myths, Realities, and Opportunities, 20 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 3 (2006).
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The market-based approach to environmental regulation took root in the
1960s and 70s as economists identified various theoretical advantages.75 In the
1980s, EPA endorsed the use of banking emissions for sources to increase
flexibility and cost-efficiency while complying with emissions regulations,76
and allowed emissions trading between refineries, leading to rapid emissions
reductions.77 EPA also developed a tradable permit program for the United
States to meet its obligations under the Montreal Protocol.78
By the 1990s, cap-and-trade programs gained greater recognition and
broader use after Congress authorized EPA to create and implement the first
interstate cap-and-trade program for emissions of SO2 under Title IV’s Acid
Rain Program.79 Under the SO2 cap-and-trade program, the total amount of
national SO2 emissions is capped at a fixed limit.80 This cap, or budget, also
indicates the amount of emissions reductions, because any emissions over that
level must be eliminated. This budget is then allocated directly to each
pollution source on an annual basis in the form of emissions allowances, which
permit the source to emit a specified amount of pollution.81 Because the
annual SO2 emissions cap results in a finite number of allowances, to induce
flexibility, the allowances may be traded between sources nationally, or

Present concerns relate to an unwavering dependence on cap and trade programs in the future,
as the structure and regulation of the program is crucial to the success of the program. Id. at 3
(“[T]he regulatory framework in which the program exists determines both the environmental and
economic effectiveness of trading.”). And, despite the success of the SO2 trading program
authorized by Title IV of the Clean Air Act, distinctions in the chemical behaviors of other
pollutants may cause difficulties in achieving the same success. Larmann, supra note 31, at 626–
31.
There is also concern that the prevalence of emissions trading will lead to exclusion of other
options available to reduce emissions of air pollutants, possibly limiting the effectiveness of cap
and trade programs. Holly Doremus & W. Michael Hanemann, Symposium, Of Babies and
Bathwater: Why the Clean Air Act’s Cooperative Federalism Framework Is Useful for
Addressing Global Warming, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 799, 806–16 (2008) (asserting that, with regard to
greenhouse gas emissions, although carbon trading seems to be the primary strategy to address
climate change, regulatory approaches implemented by local authorities, must be part of the
solution).
74. McLean statement, supra note 8.
75. Doremus & Hanemann, supra note 73, at 801.
76. EPA, Emission Trading Policy Statement, General Principles for Creation, Banking and
Use of Emission Reduction Credits, Final Policy, 51 Fed. Reg. 43,814, 43,830 (Dec. 4, 1986).
77. Doremus & Hanemann, supra note 73, at 801.
78. Id.
79. See 42 U.S.C. § 7651 (2006).
80. See Swift, supra note 68, at 3.
81. 42 U.S.C. § 7651b(a). The pollution sources regulated under the Acid Rain Program are
referred to as electric utility units.
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banked for future use or sale.82 Sources may either reduce their own emissions
to achieve compliance, or purchase additional allowances from other sources.83
The success of the Acid Rain SO2 Trading Program encouraged
subsequent use of cap-and-trade programs to reduce regional emissions of
other pollutants.84 As part of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, Congress
established the Ozone Transport Commission (OTC) to help states in the
Northeast and Mid-Atlantic region meet the NAAQS for ground-level ozone.85
In 1994, OTC created the NOx Budget Program, a cap-and-trade program
designed to reduce summertime emissions of NOx, a precursor to ozone, from
power plants and other sources in the Northeast.86 Based largely on the
successful implementation of the Acid Rain cap-and-trade program for
controlling SO2, the NOx Budget Program represented the first instance of a
group of states collaborating to form an interstate emissions trading program.87
To create the interstate emissions trading program, each OTC state
developed and adopted state regulations consistent with major provisions OTC
identified as crucial to the success of the trading program.88 Each OTC
member then allocated NOx emissions allowances to sources within the state,
which could be freely traded with sources in other OTC states.89 Under this
collaborative approach, the OTC states enacted the legislation required to
facilitate the interstate emissions trading program, while EPA was responsible
for administering data systems used to manage the program and providing
technical assistance.90
Besides inclusion of cap-and-trade programs in all recent federal proposals
to address climate change,91 international markets have also established
emissions trading programs, including the European Union and Australia.92

82. 42 U.S.C. § 7651b(b).
83. See Swift, supra note 68, at 4.
84. Doremus & Hanemann, supra note 73, at 802.
85. 42 U.S.C. § 7511c.
86. Memorandum of Understanding Among the States of the Ozone Transport Commission
on Development of a Regional Strategy Concerning the Control of Stationary Source Nitrogen
Oxide Emissions (Sept. 27, 1994), available at http://www.dec.ny.gov/docs/air_pdf/App_D.pdf.
87. Ozone Transport Commission, NOx Budget Program 1999–2002 Progress Report, EPA430-R03-900, March 2003, available at http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/progsregs/nox/docs/otc
report.pdf.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Doremus & Hanemann, supra note 73, at 804 n.29 (2008) (“Indeed, all the climate bills
that had been introduced as of 2007 used either cap-and-trade or a carbon tax as their primary
strategy.”).
92. Id. at 805. The European Union has developed an emissions trading scheme to meet its
Kyoto Protocol mission target, while two states in Australia have initiated their own trading
programs. Id.
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Presently, cap-and-trade programs are widely accepted as a fundamental aspect
of pollution control programs.93 Following the success of the Acid Rain SO2
trading program and the OTC NOx Budget Program, EPA began incorporating
interstate cap-and-trade programs in a number of subsequent rules, including
the 1998 NOx SIP Call,94 the Clean Air Interstate Rule, and the Clean Air
Mercury Rule in 2004.95
B.

The NOx SIP Call: EPA’s Creation of a Cap-and-Trade Program and
Judicial Review
1.

The NOx SIP Call

Despite these significant efforts, states affected by interstate ozone
transport were generally not able to demonstrate attainment of ozone
NAAQS.96 EPA recognized that the primary reason for this failure was the
fact that states with downwind nonattainment areas were not able to control
NOx emissions from upwind areas.97 Pursuant to its Title I authority to ensure
that states create SIPs implementing the requirements of section
110(a)(2)(D)(i)(I), EPA used this section as the statutory basis for
promulgating the NOx SIP Call, thus establishing a means to mitigate the
interstate transport of ozone.98 EPA focused on eliminating NOx emissions to
reduce ozone,99 requiring certain upwind states to revise their SIPs to include
provisions that prohibit amounts of NOx emissions that “contribute
significantly” to downwind air quality problems.100 Specifically, the NOx SIP
Call concentrated on reducing the total amount of NOx emissions from states

93. See Driesen, supra note 67, at 169.
94. Ozone Transport Assessment Group, 63 Fed. Reg. 57,356.
95. EPA, Standards of Performance for New and Existing Stationary Sources: Electric
Utility Steam Generating Units, 70 Fed. Reg. 28,606 (May 18, 2005). The Clean Air Mercury
Rule has since been invalidated, however, because EPA failed to properly de-list power plants as
a source of mercury emissions under Section 112. New Jersey v. EPA, 517 F.3d 574 (D.C. Cir.
2008).
96. Ozone Transport Assessment Group, 63 Fed. Reg. at 57,360–61.
97. Id. at 57,361.
98. Id. at 57,366.
99. The NOx SIP Call survived a challenge to EPA’s decision not to rely on volatile organic
compounds (VOCs) reductions, due to the scientific findings of OTAG that VOC controls would
not effectively address interstate ozone transport. Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d 663, 688 (2000).
100. Ozone Transport Assessment Group, 63 Fed. Reg. at 57,356. Specifically, EPA
determined that existing SIPs for one-hour ozone NAAQS were deficient, and EPA called on
these states, under CAA section 110(k)(5), to submit revisions that complied with the NOx SIP
Call. Clean Air Interstate Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. at 25,162, 25,173–74. Since SIPs addressing eighthour ozone NAAQS were not yet due at the time NOx SIP Call was promulgated, EPA required
states, pursuant to section 110(a)(1)–(2), to submit SIP revisions that fulfilled the requirements of
section 110(a)(2)(D). Id.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

648

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 54:635

subject to the rule during the summer months of May through September.101
EPA developed the NOx SIP Call with the intent that the rule not only address
the regional transport of NOx and its contribution to ozone nonattainment in
downwind areas, but also to function as a remedy for section 126 petitions
where appropriate.102
Because the Clean Air Act lacked a definition of “contribute significantly,”
EPA had to determine which emissions would be considered unlawful under
section 110(a)(2)(D)(i)(I). EPA ultimately based its definition on two
components: EPA used the actual impact of upwind emissions on downwind
nonattainment problems (the air quality factor) to determine which states must
reduce emissions, and identified the types of cost-effective control measures
available for sources within the state (the cost factor) to determine the amount
of required emissions reductions.103
In determining which states were subject to the NOx SIP Call, EPA
recognized that ozone pollution is generally caused by the aggregation of
relatively small, diverse sources across a broad geographic area.104 While a
single state’s emissions might be contributing relatively small amounts of
ozone downwind, these emissions may be contributing significantly to another
state’s nonattainment when combined with the emissions from other states.105
So EPA considered the overall nature of the ozone problem, i.e., the
“collective contribution,” in evaluating the impact of upwind states’ emissions

101. Ozone Transport Assessment Group, 63 Fed. Reg. at 57,460.
102. Id. at 57,361–62. Between 1997 and 1999, eleven northeastern states and the District of
Columbia submitted section 126 petitions to EPA, alleging that NOx emissions in the Midwest
and Southeast were contributing to their ozone nonattainment. Findings of Significant
Contribution and Rulemaking on Section 126 Petitions for Purposes of Reducing Interstate Ozone
Transport, 64 Fed. Reg. 28,250, 28,251 (May 25, 1999) (codified as amended at 40 C.F.R. § 52).
In response to the section 126 petitions, EPA intended that compliance with the NOx SIP Call
would prevent its finding a violation of section 110(a)(2)(D). Clean Air Interstate Rule, 64 Fed.
Reg. at 28,256. Due to pending litigation, however, EPA never coordinated the final rule with the
126 petitions. Findings of Significant Contribution and Rulemaking on Section 126 Petitions for
Purposes of Reducing Interstate Ozone Transport, 64 Fed. Reg. 33,962, 33,965 (June 24, 1999).
103. Ozone Transport Assessment Group, 63 Fed. Reg. at 57,376. The air quality component
included three factors: (1) the overall nature of the ozone problem; (2) the extent of the downwind
nonattainment problems to which the upwind state’s emissions are linked; and (3) the ambient
impact of the emissions from the upwind state’s sources on the downwind nonattainment
problems. Id.
104. Id. at 57,375–76. EPA relied heavily on the findings of OTAG to develop the NOx SIP
Call. Id. at 57,362–63; see supra text and notes accompanying Part I.B. for additional
information regarding OTAG. Although OTAG concluded that upwind states needed to reduce
NOx emissions, OTAG could not determine which upwind states were the most substantial
contributors to downwind ozone pollution due to its use of modeling that examined emissions,
not from any individual state, but from upwind regional groups of states. Id. at 57,383.
105. McCubbin, supra note 20, at 53–54.
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on downwind air quality.106 Based on this methodology, EPA concluded that
emissions from twenty-three states were contributing significantly to ozone
nonattainment in downwind states.107
To establish state NOx emissions reductions, EPA focused on the amount
of emissions that could be eliminated using cost-effective measures.108 By
evaluating the cost effectiveness of recently promulgated or proposed NOx
emissions regulations, EPA determined that elimination of one ton of NOx
emissions at a cost of approximately $2,000 was highly cost effective.109 EPA
then identified the pollution control devices costing no more than an average of
$2,000 per ton of emissions reduced, assuming the cost savings of a regionwide cap-and-trade program,110 and classified four types of pollution sources
that could reduce emissions through use of such devices in a cost-effective
manner.111 Finally, EPA required each state to reduce its NOx emissions by the
amount that could be eliminated if all of those sources within the state
implemented the cost-effective controls.112 Although EPA did not require
implementation of those controls, this methodology resulted in state NOx
emissions budgets based not upon the actual amount of each state’s NOx
emissions, but upon the types of sources within each state’s boundaries.113
As part of the NOx SIP Call, EPA developed an optional interstate capand-trade program to assist states in achieving emissions reductions in a costeffective manner.114 The general design of the NOx SIP Call trading program
was modeled closely after the OTC NOx Budget Program115 and similar to the
106. Ozone Transport Assessment Group, 63 Fed. Reg. at 57,377 (“The fact that virtually
every nonattainment problem is caused by numerous sources over a wide geographic area is a
factor suggesting that the solution to the problem is the implementation over a wide area of
controls on many sources, each of which may have a small or unmeasurable ambient impact by
itself.”).
107. Id. at 57,394–98. The twenty-one jurisdictions subject to the NOx SIP Call were:
Alabama, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Id.
108. Id. at 57,358.
109. Id. at 57,377–78.
110. Id.
111. Ozone Transport Assessment Group, 63 Fed. Reg. at 57,377–78. The four sources were
(1) electricity generating boilers and turbines larger than 25 MWe; (2) large non-electricity
generating industrial boilers and turbines; (3) cement manufacturing sources; and (4) internal
combustion engines. Id.
112. Id.
113. See McCubbin, supra note 20, at 56 (“Yet, under the NOx SIP Call, two states
contributing the same amount of ozone to downwind states, by EPA’s definition, nevertheless
could be contributing dramatically different ‘significant’ amounts of ozone.”) (emphasis added).
114. Ozone Transport Assessment Group, 63 Fed. Reg. at 57,456.
115. Interstate Quality Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. 4566, 4629. The OTC NOx Budget Program was
incorporated into the NOx SIP Call. Id.
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trading program for SO2 under the Acid Rain Regulation.116 This scheme
employed a region-wide cap on total emissions, equal to the aggregate amount
of NOx emissions budgets of states subject to the NOx SIP Call.117 Once the
states received their NOx emissions budgets, each state divided its emissions
allowances among a specific group of sources.118 These sources were then free
to buy additional emissions allowances from, or sell surplus allowances to,
other in-state sources or out-of-state sources within the NOx SIP Call region.119
The NOx SIP Call trading program also permitted sources to “bank” unused
emissions allowances for use in a later period.120
2.

Michigan v. EPA

Although the cap-and-trade program included in the NOx SIP Call was not
challenged in Michigan v. EPA,121 other relevant aspects of the NOx SIP Call
were subject to judicial review.122 For the most part, the Michigan court
upheld EPA’s analytical approach in the NOx SIP Call, including EPA’s
consideration of cost in determining a state’s “significant contribution,” and
the imposition of state NOx emissions reductions equal to the amount
achievable using highly cost-effective controls, regardless of the state’s
emissions contribution.123
Petitioners first argued that EPA was precluded from considering the costs
of pollution control measures in determining what constitutes “significant
contribution” within the meaning of section 110(a)(2)(D).124 The court upheld
EPA’s approach, asserting that “there is nothing in the text, structure, or
history of section 110(a)(2)(D) that bars EPA from considering cost” in
determining the amount at which a state’s air pollution emissions contribute
significantly to downwind nonattainment, and, therefore, must be reduced.125

116. Brown, supra note 64, at 966.
117. Ozone Transport Assessment Group, 63 Fed. Reg. at 57,456–60.
118. Id. at 57,460. The core group of large stationary sources includes all fossil fuel-fired
stationary boilers, combustion turbines, and combined cycle systems that serve an electrical
generator of capacity greater than 25 MWe. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 57,472. The NOx SIP Call included restrictions on banking provisions to limit the
potential for significantly higher emissions levels due to banking. Id. at 57,473. The NOx SIP
Call allowed unlimited banking of allowances, but discouraged excessive use of banked
allowances by establishing a limit on the number that can be used each season without restriction.
Id. Sources that use banked allowances in an amount greater than 10% of the NOx budget for
those sources are subject to a discounted rate on their use. Id.
121. 213 F.3d 663 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
122. Id. at 669–71.
123. Id. at 674–80.
124. Id. at 674.
125. Id. at 679.
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Petitioners also challenged EPA’s method of determining NOx emissions
reductions for each state based on implementation of highly cost-effective
controls instead of actual emissions.126 The court asserted that, because it
upheld EPA’s definition of significant contribution as a function of cost, it
would uphold the consequence: once a state is subject to the NOx SIP Call,
even a state with low NOx emissions must make reductions equivalent to those
achievable by highly cost-effective measures.127 Ultimately, Michigan meant
that a state’s “significant contribution,” the amount of emissions the state is
required to eliminate under section 110(a)(2)(D), need not be based solely on
its actual impact on another state’s air quality.128
EPA interpreted the Michigan decision as judicial approval of its approach
to limit state emissions based on a uniform cost method, “without concern as to
the arguably inconsistent ambient impacts that may result.”129 In addition,
EPA relied heavily on the Michigan decision to validate its promulgation of
CAIR’s model cap-and-trade programs.130
III. THE CLEAN AIR INTERSTATE RULE
In May 2005, EPA promulgated CAIR to address interstate transport of
ozone and fine particulate matter, utilizing the cost-efficiency of a cap-andtrade program.131 With updated air quality and emissions data available, EPA

126. Michigan, 213 F.3d at 679.
127. Id. Although sources closer to nonattainment areas tend to have larger effects on air
quality than sources far away, the court upheld EPA’s uniform cost-based approach to emissions
reduction because EPA’s research showed that “non-uniform regional approaches by comparison
did not ‘provide either a significant improvement in air quality or a substantial reduction in
cost.’” Id. (quoting Ozone Transport Assessment Group, 63 Fed. Reg. at 57,423).
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Sentelle indicated that the majority wrongly applied both
statutory interpretation and prior case law to allow EPA’s consideration of cost under section
110(a)(2)(D)(i)(I). Judge Sentelle concluded that EPA’s statutory authority is limited to
controlling emissions based on one criterion: the amounts of emissions that contribute
significantly to downwind nonattainment. Id. at 696. Judge Sentelle asserted that EPA, however,
adopted a different criterion: the cost effectiveness of emissions reductions. Id. Thus, because
EPA exceeded its statutory authority, the NOx SIP Call should have been invalidated without
consideration of the subsidiary issues, one of which included the use of uniform controls. See id.
128. See Michigan, 213 F.3d at 681–86.
129. Clean Air Interstate Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. 25,162, 25,177.
130. Id. at 25,174–78. “The EPA developed today’s rule relying heavily on the NOx SIP Call
approach.” Id. at 25,171. “[T]he Court approved EPA’s approach of requiring the same control
level on all affected States, without concern as to the arguably inconsistent ambient impacts that
may result. By the same token, in today’s action, EPA’s approach should be accepted
notwithstanding that the upwind controls could, at least in theory, result in an ambient impact that
is below the initial threshold.” Id. at 25,177.
131. Id. at 25,162.
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reassessed its regulation of interstate ozone transport through emissions
reductions of its precursor, NOx.132
EPA also addressed interstate air pollution transport for PM2.5 for the first
time, requiring emissions reductions for its precursors, SO2 and NOx through
CAIR.133 Continuing a strategy of interstate air pollution control through
market-based emissions trading programs, EPA replaced the NOx SIP Call
Trading Program with the CAIR ozone-season NOx Trading Program to reduce
ozone.134 For PM2.5 regulation, EPA added an annual NOx Trading Program,
and streamlined the Acid Rain SO2 Trading Program with CAIR’s SO2 Trading
Program.135
A.

Purpose and Structure of the Clean Air Interstate Rule

Similar to the NOx SIP Call, EPA promulgated CAIR pursuant to its Title I
responsibility to ensure that states have in place SIPs containing prohibitions
on emissions activity that contributes significantly to nonattainment in another
state.136 Basically, CAIR was designed to facilitate attainment of NAAQS for
PM2.5 and ozone in downwind areas by requiring emissions reductions of its
precursors, SO2 and NOx, from sources in certain upwind states.137 EPA thus
required upwind states to revise their SIPs to include control measures to
reduce interstate transport of these emissions.138
EPA’s approach to CAIR reflected “a broad new program of regional
controls.”139 For PM2.5 regulation, EPA focused on “large regional reductions”
of annual SO2 and NOx emissions as more likely to result in significant
reductions of PM2.5.140 In assessing the air quality impact of each state, EPA
adopted a low threshold level of permissible emissions, subjecting any state
with emissions surpassing the minimum level to CAIR’s regulatory
requirements.141 EPA asserted that this stringent level reflected the fact that
PM2.5 nonattainment problems resulted “from the combined impact of
relatively small contributions from many upwind States, along with
contributions from in-State sources and, in some cases, substantially larger

132. Id. at 25,168.
133. Id.
134. Clean Air Interstate Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. at 25,166.
135. Id. at 25,162.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Clean Air Interstate Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. at 25,183.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 25,174–75. EPA adopted a threshold air quality impact of 0.2 μg/m3, so that an
upwind state with contributions to downwind nonattainment below this level would not be subject
to regulatory requirements, but a state with contributions at this level or higher would be subject
to further evaluation. Id.
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contributions from a subset of particular upwind States,” demonstrating a
pattern termed in the NOx SIP Call as “collective contribution.”142 EPA,
therefore, postulated attainment may only be achieved by controlling sources
throughout the entire region, even if individual contributions are small.143
Accordingly, EPA found that twenty-five upwind states and the District of
Columbia contribute significantly to the nonattainment of NAAQS for PM2.5 in
downwind states.144
Although progress had been made in reducing ozone in many urban areas
under the NOx SIP Call, EPA reevaluated ozone-season pollution in CAIR,145
recognizing that the Eastern area continued to experience elevated levels of
regional scale ozone during the extended summer ozone season.146 In
regulating ozone, EPA relied on OTAG’s assessments of ozone control
approaches, which concluded that NOx regulation would be the most effective
strategy for reducing regional ozone transport.147 Finding that twenty-five
states and the District of Columbia contribute significantly to the
nonattainment of eight-hour ozone NAAQS in another state,148 CAIR
subjected these upwind states to an ozone-season NOx cap during May through
142. Id. at 25,189.
143. Id. at 25,175.
144. The original twenty-three states along with the District of Columbia that CAIR required
to reduce annual SO2 and NOx emissions for the purposes of the PM2.5 NAAQS are: Alabama,
Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Missouri, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Clean Air Interstate Rule, 70 Fed.
Reg. at 25,167. In later action, EPA included Delaware and New Jersey in the rule for PM2.5.
Inclusion of Delaware and New Jersey in the Clean Air Interstate Rule, 71 Fed. Reg. 25,288
(April 28, 2006).
145. Unlike EPA’s effort in the NOx SIP Call, which addressed both one-hour and eight-hour
ozone standards, in CAIR, EPA focused solely on regulation of the eight-hour ozone standard.
Id. at 25,175. In 1997, EPA promulgated revised primary and secondary standards for ozone,
reducing the maximum allowable concentration of ozone in ambient air over an averaged eighthour period, as opposed to the pre-existing, and less stringent, one-hour ozone standards. 40
C.F.R. § 50.10. EPA revoked the one-hour ozone standard in June 2005, one year after
publishing the eight-hour ozone attainment and nonattainment designations. Recently, the EPA
lowered the allowable level of ozone in ambient air from .08 ppm averaged over an eight-hour
period to .075 ppm. EPA, National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, 73 Fed. Reg.
16,436 (Mar. 27, 2008) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 50).
146. Clean Air Interstate Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. at 25,185. Ozone concentration levels are higher
during summer months due to several contributing circumstances. First, ozone formation
increases with higher temperatures and sunlight. Id. Second, warmer temperatures increase
emissions of man-made and biogenic organics, which also may indirectly increase NOx levels.
Id. Finally, weather conditions in summertime also bring increased episodes of large-scale
stagnation, which promote the buildup of direct emissions and pollutants formed through
atmospheric reactions over large regions. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 25,167.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

654

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 54:635

September, reflecting the higher ozone concentrations during summer
months.149 States subject to CAIR for both PM2.5 and ozone, however, are
subject to both an annual and an ozone-season NOx emissions limitation.150
To quantify the amounts of emissions that contribute significantly to
nonattainment, and thus subject a state to regulation under CAIR, EPA
essentially adopted the same formulation of factors as applied in the NOx SIP
Call.151 EPA first considered the air quality factor, which utilized air quality
modeling of SO2 and NOx emissions in each upwind state to estimate the
ambient impact on downwind nonattainment areas.152 This determined
whether a state would be subject to CAIR.153 Second, EPA considered the cost
factor: “As in the case of the NOx Sip Call, EPA interprets this factor as
mandating emissions reductions in amounts that would result from application
of highly cost-effective controls.”154 If a state, therefore, exceeded a specified
threshold level of emissions according to air quality analysis, it is then
considered for emissions reductions—which would be in an amount based
upon the cost of achieving those reductions.155
EPA’s use of the cost factor required evaluation of various pollution
control technologies available for different sources as well as any
implementation costs.156 Although CAIR did not require that upwind states
implement the specific control measures, CAIR did require states to achieve a
specified level of emissions reductions—in an amount based on levels
achievable if the control strategies that EPA identified as highly cost-effective
were implemented.157 Furthermore, because interstate emissions trading would
149. Id. at 25,232. The twenty-five states along with the District of Columbia that must
reduce NOx emissions for purposes of the 8-hour ozone NAAQS are: Alabama, Arkansas,
Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Id.
150. Id. at 25,289.
151. Clean Air Interstate Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. at 25,174–75 (“[W]e adopt the formulation of
those factors as described in CAIR NPR, which has little conceptual difference from EPA’s
application of those factors in the NOx SIP Call.”).
152. Id. at 25,174–75.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 25,189.
156. Clean Air Interstate Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. at 25,175. EPA ultimately concluded electric
generating units (EGUs) were the only source for which highly cost-effective SO2 and NOx
controls were available. Id.
157. Id. at 25,172–73. While CAIR’s emissions reduction requirements were based on costeffective measures for controlling EGUs, states may choose whatever measures needed to achieve
the specified emissions reductions, and need not control EGUs. Id. at 25,167. CAIR, therefore,
defined “EGU budgets” for each state that choose to adopt controls for EGUs, but also included
reduction requirements for a state that chooses to achieve some or all of its required emissions
reductions by controlling sources other than EGUs. Id. For states choosing to achieve emissions
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result in less expensive reductions, EPA assumed that states opted into the
model program when evaluating control costs of the required reductions—
although state participation in the cap-and-trade program was not required.158
B.

Regulation of SO2 Emissions

EPA’s methodology in establishing SO2 emissions reductions was based
on the initial allocations of SO2 allowances prescribed in the Title IV Acid
Rain Program.159 EPA rationalized that the Title IV Acid Rain program was a
logical basis for assessing emissions reductions because a large majority of
EGU sources affected by CAIR were currently subject to the cap on SO2
emissions under the Acid Rain program.160 But since CAIR required
substantially greater reductions in SO2 emissions than Title IV, EGUs within
the CAIR region would emit significantly less SO2 under CAIR and could be
expected to have a substantial number of excess allowances to emit SO2.161 In
order to synchronize the two cap-and-trade programs, EPA retained the use of
Title IV allowances as currency for CAIR’s cap-and-trade program, but
effectively lowered the amount of emissions each Title IV allowance
authorized.162 EPA reasoned that basing the CAIR SO2 reductions on Title IV
allowances was integral to the viability and effectiveness of both the Acid Rain
Program and CAIR.163

reductions by controlling EGUs, however, the EGU budgets are mandatory, whether or not they
participate in the corresponding cap-and-trade program. Id. at 25,229. For a state choosing to
require emissions reductions from both EGU and non-EGU sources, the state would obtain a
higher EGU budget, thus allowing more emissions from EGUs; however, the difference would
equal the amount of emissions reductions that the state can demonstrate it will achieve from nonEGU sources. Id. at 25,259.
158. Id. at 25,196 (“In modeling the CAIR . . . EPA assumes interstate emissions trading.
While EPA is not requiring States to participate in an interstate trading program . . . we believe it
is reasonable to evaluate control costs assuming States choose to participate in such a program
since that will result in less expensive reductions.”).
159. Id. at 25,229.
160. Id. While the Title IV SO2 emissions reductions applied to the entire nation, about 90%
of EGUs and EGU SO2 emissions nationwide were subject to the CAIR SO2 region. Id. at
25,294.
161. Clean Air Interstate Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. at 25,294.
162. Id. at 25,293–95. CAIR increased the number of allowances required to emit one ton of
SO2 in 2010 (two allowances per ton) and 2015 (2.68 allowances per ton).
163. Id. at 25,308. This flood of excess allowances would effectively collapse the market for
Title IV allowances, and the system would no longer provide any incentive for sources to adopt
long-term strategies for pollution reduction in order to sell excess SO2 allowances. Id. at 25,294–
95. Further, EPA was concerned that EGUs not regulated by CAIR but subject to the Acid Rain
Program could use surplus Title IV allowances outside the CAIR region, potentially increasing
SO2 emissions by about 29% in 2010 and threatening the environmental gains achieved in those
states. Id. at 25,295.
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EPA established annual region-wide SO2 emissions budgets by reducing
the emissions levels set forth through the Title IV Acid Rain Program for
EGUs.164 Thus, CAIR implemented SO2 reductions in two phases: the regionwide annual budget for the years 2010–2014 (Phase I) was based on a 50%
reduction of Title IV allowances for all sources within the CAIR region, while
the region-wide annual budget for 2015 and beyond (Phase II) was based on a
65% reduction of the same allowances.165 EPA then determined that these
reductions could be achieved assuming participation in the cap-and-trade
program and implementation of cost-effective controls on EGUs.166
In determining state SO2 emissions reductions, EPA asserted that while
initial allocations of state budgets may be important for “distributional reasons,
under a cap and trade system, they would not impact the attainment of the
environmental objectives or the overall cost of this rule.”167 Consequently,
state SO2 emissions budgets were established in the same manner as the
region-wide budget: the number of SO2 emissions allowances allocated to
sources within the state through Title IV were reduced by 50% for 2010 and
65% for 2015.168
C. Regulation of NOx Emissions
To establish the region-wide annual NOx budget for PM2.5, EPA based
reductions on total NOx emissions from the CAIR region, multiplied by a
uniform emissions rate that assumed use of highly cost-effective controls on
EGUs.169 Acknowledging advancements in technology and widespread use of
specific controls on EGUs, EPA started with the same emissions rate multiplier
used in the NOx SIP Call, but manipulated it to substantially reduce more NOx
emissions in CAIR.170 As with SO2 reductions, CAIR implemented NOx
emissions reductions in two phases: Phase One (for 2009) provided a higher
emissions rate multiplier, and Phase Two (for 2015) used a lower multiplier to

164. Id. at 25,201–05.
165. Id. at 25,229.
166. Clean Air Interstate Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. at 25,204.
167. Id. at 25,229. EPA consistently maintained that “[l]arge regional reductions in both
pollutants, however, are more likely to result in a significant reductions [sic] in fine particles.”
Id. at 25,183.
168. Id. at 25,229–30.
169. Id. at 25,205. EPA ascertained the amount of regional NOx emissions by summing the
average annual heat input for EGUs in states within the CAIR region from 1999 through 2002.
Id. at 25,205–06. EPA developed the NOx emissions rate multipliers based on a target level of
emissions, considering available technical information on pollution controls, costs to industry and
the general public, and ambient air improvement. Id. at 25,205.
170. Id. at 25,205–06.
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result in a lower region-wide NOx emissions budget.171 EPA then evaluated
these emissions reductions using modeling techniques to conclude that they
were highly cost-effective and feasible, assuming controls on EGUs and
interstate emissions trading.172
After determining the region-wide budget, EPA then apportioned it among
upwind states according to the number of oil, gas, and coal-fired EGUs within
each state.173 This fuel factor method provided larger NOx emissions budgets
to states with more coal-fired EGUs, which have higher emissions rates, thus
requiring installation of more expensive controls in order to reduce the
economic burden on those states.174 Likewise, states with more oil-fired or
natural gas-fired facilities received smaller NOx emissions budgets, reflecting
less expensive controls, and prevented a financial benefit to oil-fired or natural
gas-fired sources that received allowances in excess of their actual anticipated
needs.175 Use of the fuel factor method resulted in adjusted state budgets with
a significantly different outcome than unadjusted state budgets. Essentially,
states with mostly coal-fired EGUs were required to reduce a lower amount of
NOx emissions using the fuel factor method, while states with mainly gas or
oil-fired EGUs were required to reduce more NOx emissions regardless of
actual state NOx emissions.176 EPA adopted this approach to provide more
equitable distribution, in light of the differing reduction requirements of each
source, and since the method in setting state budgets “makes little difference,”
as participation in a cap-and-trade program would result in an outcome that
does “not depend on the relative levels of individual State budgets.”177
171. Clean Air Interstate Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. at 25,230–31. The historical annual heat input
data of the applicable states was multiplied by 0.15 lb/mmBtu for 2009 and 0.125 lb/mmBtu for
2015. Id. In addition, EPA supplemented the regional emissions budget for 2009 with a one-time
Compliance Supplement Pool of 200,000 NOx allowances. Id. at 25,231–32.
172. Id. at 25,205–06.
173. Id. at 25,230–31.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. See Clean Air Interstate Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. at 25,230.
177. Id. at 25,230–31. In reducing NOx emissions, both CAIR and the NOx SIP Call initially
involved an air quality analysis for each upwind state: If an upwind state violated the threshold,
the required emissions reductions, i.e., the state’s significant contribution, are based on costeffective measures. Id. at 25,174–75. In CAIR, however, the NOx region-wide budget was
established first, equal to the total NOx emissions of all CAIR states multiplied by a rate that was
evaluated as highly cost-effective. This budget was then distributed among the states. Id. at
25,205. In the NOx SIP Call, individual state budgets were determined first by multiplying the
NOx emissions of each state by an emissions rate that reflected implementation of highly costeffective controls; each state’s budget was then added to create the region-wide budget. Ozone
Transport Assessment Group, 63 Fed. Reg. 57,356, 57,456–60.
Arguably, the methods used by both rules to establish region-wide NOx emissions caps are
simply two ways of reaching the same number. The difference in methodology lies in
determining NOx state budgets. CAIR included an additional step: allocation of the region-wide
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To regulate ozone, EPA established the region-wide ozone-season NOx
budget by multiplying the region’s ozone-season NOx emissions by the same
multipliers used to determine the annual NOx budget for PM2.5.178 However,
states subject to CAIR’s ozone-season NOx cap are only required to make
reductions during the months of May through September.179 EPA distributed
state budgets using the same fuel factor method as that used in calculating
annual NOx emissions for PM2.5: each state received a portion of the regionwide cap based on the amount and types of EGUs responsible for ozone-season
NOx emissions in that state.180
D. The Design of CAIR’s Cap-and-Trade Programs
States subject to CAIR emissions reductions were given an opportunity to
participate in EPA-managed cap-and-trade programs for annual SO2 emissions,
annual NOx emissions, and ozone-season NOx emissions, if they adopted the
model rules set forth in CAIR.181 EPA acknowledged that the purpose of
CAIR’s interstate cap-and-trade programs was to reduce emissions on a
regional level,182 reasoning that regional reductions are generally more costeffective than local controls, and suitably address the nature of PM2.5 and
ozone formation over a vast geographic region.183 EPA also acknowledged
that a state’s decision to participate in CAIR’s cap-and-trade programs was
optional.184
With respect to NOx regulation, EPA replaced the NOx SIP Call cap-andtrade program with the CAIR ozone-season NOx trading program, and created
a new CAIR annual NOx trading program.185 Consequently, a state opting into
CAIR’s annual or ozone-season NOx trading program may allocate its
emissions budget to sources based upon its chosen method of allocation.186
But in promulgating CAIR’s SO2 cap and trade programs, EPA intended to
budget to states based on a fuel-factor method, which provided equitable re-distribution according
to the proportion of oil, gas, and coal-fired facilities within each state. Clean Air Interstate Rule,
70 Fed. Reg. at 25,230–31.
178. Clean Air Interstate Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. at 25,232.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 25,274. EPA reinforced the optional aspect of the trading programs because the
Clean Air Act only provides authority for EPA to set air quality standards; it is the sole
responsibility of the states to decide how it will meet those standards. See supra text and notes
accompanying Part I.B.
182. Interstate Quality Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. 4566, 4630 (“Cap and trade programs are designed
to reduce emissions of numerous polluting sources by significant amounts over large geographic
areas.”).
183. Clean Air Interstate Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. at 25,183–84.
184. Id. at 25,167.
185. Id. at 25,162.
186. Id. at 25,274.
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streamline its operation with the existing Acid Rain SO2 cap-and-trade
program.187 For sources subject to both the Acid Rain Program and CAIR,
CAIR’s SO2 cap-and-trade program was designed to satisfy the ongoing
statutory requirements of Title IV as well as CAIR emissions requirements.188
States are thus not required to distribute allowances because sources already
received their SO2 allowances through Title IV.189
Similar to previous cap-and-trade programs, while CAIR’s regional cap
may not be exceeded, initial emissions caps at the state level did not constitute
an enforceable emissions limit on the state.190 Rather, state budgets operated
as a starting point; once sources received their emissions allowances, they
could freely trade with other in-state or out-of-state sources subject to CAIR.191
In proposing CAIR’s cap-and-trade programs, EPA addressed concerns
relating to a theorized increase of air pollution in specific areas, or “hot spots,”
due to the increase in emissions of a specific group of sources that purchased
more allowances.192 EPA confirmed that the environmental results observed
under the Acid Rain Program suggested the opposite; the combination of
trading with a stringent emissions cap resulted in substantial reductions of
emissions throughout the region, with the highest emitting sources tending to
Further, EPA assumed
reduce emissions by the greatest amount.193

187. Id. at 25,162.
188. Clean Air Interstate Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. at 25,274.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 25,229.
191. See id. at 25,231 (“If States choose to . . . participate in the cap and trade program,
allowances could be freely traded . . . . [and] would not depend on the relative levels of individual
State budgets.”).
192. Interstate Quality Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. 4566, 4629 (“One concern with emissions trading
programs is that the flexibility associated with trading might allow sources or groups of sources
to increase emissions, resulting in areas of elevated pollution or ‘hot spots.’”). See Steven M.
Johnson, Economics v. Equity: Do Market-Based Environmental Reforms Exacerbate
Environmental Injustice?, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 111, 112 (1999) (theorizing that trading
programs may increase pollution in certain areas to create hot spots).
193. Interstate Quality Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. at 4629. Other independent analyses, including
those by the Environmental Law Institute, Environmental Defense, and the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology’s Center for Energy and Environmental Policy, examined emissions
trading under the Acid Rain Program, and none concluded that emissions trading resulted in hot
spots of high emissions. Id. In comparing actual SO2 emissions by state with the number of
allowances issued to that state, data from the first four years of the Acid Rain Program revealed
that emissions of virtually all states are well below their allocated allowance levels, with only
three states slightly above. Byron Swift, Acid Rain Allowance Trading and SO2 Hot Spots—Good
News from the Acid Rain Program, 31 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 954, 956 fig.1 (2000). Further, 81% of
additional allowances purchased to offset actual emissions came from the same state as the
emitting source, “a high level that indicates a relative lack of emissions-shifting through trading.”
Id. The data also revealed that sources with the largest amounts of emissions have made the most
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participation in CAIR’s interstate cap-and-trade programs to determine
emissions reductions because it resulted in less expensive emissions
reductions, thus allowing EPA to justify a lower region-wide budget for SO2
and NOx emissions.194 Considering the overall reduction of SO2 emissions
under the Acid Rain Program, a lower region-wide budget under CAIR
suggests similarly decreased SO2 and NOx emissions.195
IV. NORTH CAROLINA V. EPA
Much of EPA’s justification for its analytical approach in CAIR is based
on the purported approval it received from the D.C. Court of Appeals in
Michigan regarding the NOx SIP Call.196 Since Michigan left most of the NOx
SIP Call requirements intact, EPA largely adopted the same interpretation and
application of section 110(a)(2)(D) for regulating downwind transport of PM2.5
and ozone precursors.197 In North Carolina v. EPA, however, the D.C. court
vacated CAIR in its entirety, condemning EPA’s approach as “fundamentally

reductions, indicating that “if anything, trading may be expected to cool hot spots and not create
them.” Id.
194. See Clean Air Interstate Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. at 25,196–97. A state’s adoption of the capand-trade programs would not be binding on a tribe located within the state. Id. at 25,167. In
discussing the consequences of non-uniform adoption of emissions-trading programs with respect
to tribes, EPA explained:
[A]s a matter of policy, cap and trade programs by their nature must apply consistently
throughout the geographic region of the program in order to be effective. Otherwise, the
existence of areas not covered by the cap could create incentives to locate sources there,
and thereby undermine the environmental goals of the program.
Id. at 25,167–68.
The concern seems to be that an unregulated flow of emissions could be emitted from an area that
is not subject to the emissions caps CAIR requires. EPA distinguished its position with situations
in which a state does not participate in the cap-and-trade program, asserting:
[T]he failure of a State to participate does not raise the same environmental integrity
concern. A state that does not participate in the cap and trade program must still submit a
SIP that limits emissions to the levels mandated by the CAIR emission reduction
requirements, taking into account any emissions from new sources.
Id. at 25,168 n.10.
But even if an area is subject to CAIR’s state emissions budgets, sources within that state are free
to purchase more allowances from out-of-state sources under CAIR’s cap-and-trade program,
increasing their emissions and, thus, potentially exceeding the state emissions budget. Id. at
25,230–31 (“If States choose to . . . participate in the cap and trade program, allowances could be
freely traded, encouraging least-cost compliance over the entire region. In such a case, the leastcost outcome would not depend on the relative levels of individual state budgets.”).
195. See Interstate Quality Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. at 4629; see also Swift, supra note 193, at 955–
58.
196. Clean Air Interstate Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. at 25,174–78.
197. Id. at 25,174.
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flawed,” and putting into question whether EPA has authority to create
interstate emissions trading programs.198
On the heels of EPA’s promulgation of CAIR, EPA received twelve
petitions for reconsideration of the rule, six of which were granted,199 although
EPA ultimately proposed no changes to CAIR.200 In addition to these
petitions, fourteen petitions for judicial review of the final rule were filed with
the D.C. Court of Appeals by electric utility companies, environmental
protection groups, upwind states subject to CAIR emissions reductions, and
downwind states purportedly affected by the significant contribution of upwind
states.201 These petitions were consolidated into a single case: State of North
Carolina v. EPA.202 The scope of this section, though, will only address the
challenges to CAIR’s model cap-and-trade programs, EPA’s method of
determining state NOx emissions budgets for the NOx trading programs, and
EPA’s determination of SO2 emissions budgets.
A.

CAIR’s Cap-and-Trade Programs

North Carolina’s persistent objections to EPA’s approach to regulation of
interstate air pollution transport finally reached judicial review in North
Carolina v. EPA.203 In its challenge to CAIR’s cap-and-trade programs, North
Carolina argued that the unrestricted interstate trading of pollution allowances
in CAIR’s cap-and-trade programs failed to assure that upwind states would
abate unlawful emissions, thus subverting application of CAIR as a fulfillment

198. North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896, 929 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
199. See Clean Air Interstate Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. 25,162, 25,162.
200. Rulemaking on Section 126 Petition from North Carolina to Reduce Interstate Transport
of Fine Particulate Matter and Ozone, 70 Fed. Reg. 49,708 (Aug. 24, 2005).
201. Brief of Petitioner at i, North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (No. 051244) [hereinafter Petitioner’s Brief]. Of the fourteen petitions, two were voluntarily dismissed.
Id.
202. North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896, 896 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
203. In 2004, North Carolina petitioned EPA pursuant to section 126, seeking the reduction of
SO2 and NOx emissions from thirteen states that were significantly contributing to PM2.5 and/or
ozone nonattainment in North Carolina. Revisions to the Clean Air Interstate Rule, 71 Fed. Reg.
25,328, 25,334 (Apr. 28, 2006). EPA finally responded to North Carolina’s request two years
later (after promulgation of CAIR), and denied the section 126 petition, stating that the required
emissions reductions in CAIR and the subsequent FIP operated as a complete remedy to the
petition. Id. at 25,337–38. In addition to filing a petition for judicial review of CAIR, North
Carolina had also petitioned EPA for reconsideration of CAIR after promulgation of the final rule
(which was subsequently denied) and reconsideration of its denial of North Carolina’s request for
relief under section 126. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, DOCKET NO. OAR-2003-0053, PETITION FOR
CONSIDERATION BY THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA ON RULE TO REDUCE INTERSTATE
TRANSPORT OF FINE PARTICULATE MATTER AND OZONE (CLEAN AIR INSTITUTE RULE);
REVISIONS TO ACID RAIN PROGRAM; REVISIONS TO THE NOx SIP CALL, available at
http://www.epa.gov/cair/pdfs/pfr_nc.pdf.
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of EPA’s section 110(a)(2)(D)(i) duty to address interstate pollution
transport.204 North Carolina contended that “a program that relies on trading
cannot guarantee elimination of the ‘significant contribution’ from ‘within the
State,’ as the statute requires,”205 as sources within a state could acquire
allowances in excess of the state’s budget.206 North Carolina, however, did not
allege that interstate emissions trading is per se unlawful, but actually endorsed
the use of cap-and-trade programs as a strategy for cost-effective emissions
reductions.207 Nor did North Carolina seek vacatur of CAIR, but requested
that CAIR merely be remanded “so as to not relax, even temporarily,
environmental protections that are already not strict enough.”208
EPA’s arguments in defense of its interstate trading program were unheard
in the North Carolina opinion, but indicated the practical considerations in
determining a feasible method to reduce air pollutants. EPA contended that
because trading allows emissions reductions to be achieved in the most costeffective manner, removing or limiting the trading program would increase the
cost of controls, and likely result in a determination that a less stringent level
of emissions controls is highly cost-effective.209 EPA rebutted North
Carolina’s argument that CAIR fails to assure relief to downwind
nonattainment areas by asserting that implementation of the Acid Rain and
NOx SIP Call trading programs “did not result in creation of the sort of ‘hot
spots’ feared by North Carolina.”210 EPA also maintained that since all of the
states participating in CAIR’s cap-and-trade programs were contributing
significantly to downwind nonattainment, reductions, wherever they occur,
would improve air quality throughout the region.211 Finally, EPA stressed that
the pollutants regulated by CAIR are a regional concern due to their interstate
transport across multiple states, and a regional approach to controlling them is
appropriate.212
Nevertheless, observing that EPA designed CAIR “to eliminate the
significant contribution of upwind states, as a whole, to downwind
nonattainment,” the North Carolina court found fault with EPA’s region-wide

204. Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 201, at 29.
205. Id. at 15.
206. Id. at 29.
207. Id. at 33 (“The State supports measures, like trading, that maximize cost savings and
flexibility for EGUs, so long as the State receives the benefit of the reductions required by law.”).
208. Reply Brief of Petitioner the State of North Carolina at 18, North Carolina v. EPA, 531
F.3d 896 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (No. 05-1244).
209. Brief for Respondent United States Environmental Protection Agency at 164–65, North
Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (No. 05-1244) [hereinafter EPA Brief].
210. Id. at 168.
211. Id. at 166.
212. Id. at 164–65.
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approach to CAIR.213 The court asserted that by establishing emissions
reductions on a regional level, EPA had not considered the unlawful amount of
pollution from each state.214 Although EPA initially evaluated state emissions
by measuring the air quality impact to determine which states would be subject
to CAIR, once the CAIR region was established, the state emissions reductions
were based on cost-efficiency, not air quality impact.215 In particular, the court
noted that EPA did not purport to measure each state’s significant contribution
to specific downwind nonattainment areas and “eliminate them in an isolated,
state-by-state manner,” because capping the emissions of each state would not
achieve reductions in “the most cost-effective manner.”216 EPA instead
assumed state participation in interstate emissions trading when evaluating
control costs on a regional, not state, level.217 The court concluded that EPA’s
apportionment decisions had nothing to do with each state’s significant
contribution because EPA failed to measure each state’s unlawful amount of
pollution in determining the apportionments.218
The court cited section 110(a)(2)(D)(i)(I) of the Clean Air Act to
emphasize that the statute calls for measurement and elimination of each
state’s contribution to another state’s nonattainment instead of CAIR’s
assurance that the entire region’s significant contribution will be eliminated.219
The model trading programs included in CAIR may or may not affect the
amount of emissions from an individual upwind state. And although initial
emissions budgets were allocated to states, sources have the opportunity to
purchase emissions credits from sources in other states.220 As a result, states
may emit more pollution than their caps would otherwise permit.221
Because CAIR is designed as a complete remedy to section
110(a)(2)(D)(i)(I) problems, the court held that EPA must actually require
elimination of emissions by measuring each state’s significant contribution to
downwind nonattainment, even if that measurement does not directly correlate
with each state’s individualized air quality impact on downwind nonattainment
relative to other upwind states.222 Otherwise, the court asserted, “the rule is

213. North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896, 907 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
214. Id. (“Because EPA evaluated whether its proposed emissions reductions were ‘highly
cost effective,’ at the regionwide level assuming a trading program, it never measured the
‘significant contribution’ from sources within an individual state to downwind nonattainment
areas.”).
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896, 907 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
219. Id.
220. See 70 Fed. Reg. 25,230–31.
221. See North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896, 907 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
222. Id. at 908.
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not effectuating the statutory mandate of prohibiting emissions moving from
one state to another, leaving EPA with no statutory authority for its action.”223
B.

SO2 Emissions Budgets

The EPA’s decision to base CAIR’s SO2 emissions reductions on Title
IV’s SO2 emissions reductions was challenged by various utility companies.224
In addressing the issue of SO2 budgets, the court found that EPA’s decision to
base the budgets on allowances received under Title IV’s Acid Rain Program
was not a “logical starting point” for setting CAIR’s SO2 emissions caps.225
First, the court asserted that reducing the Title IV allowance scheme,
legislation enacted in 1990, based on data from 1985 to 1987 and designed to
address the national acid rain problem, would not be an appropriate method for
regulating the interstate transport of PM2.5 in 2015.226 Without an explanation
of how Title IV allowances are relevant to the obligation of states to prohibit
emissions from contributing significantly to PM2.5 nonattainment, the court
found that EPA’s budget determinations were arbitrary.227 In response to
EPA’s assertion that its primary goal in basing budgets on Title IV allowances
was to preserve the Acid Rain Program, the court rejected this goal as not
among the objectives in section 110(a)(2)(D)(i)(I).228
The court also found that EPA failed to explain how the determination of
region-wide SO2 emissions caps based on a 50% and 65% reduction of the
Title IV allowances relate to the objectives of section 110(a)(2)(D)(i)(I)
prohibiting emissions from one state from contributing to nonattainment in
another state.229 While the court assumed that the percentage reductions
represent “a cost-effective and equitable governmental approach” to
attainment, it held that an equitable governmental approach is not among the
objectives of section 110(a)(2)(D)(i)(I).230 Further, the court asserted that
223. Id.
224. SO2 petitioners also challenged the EPA’s attempt to streamline CAIR’s regulation of
SO2 with the existing cap-and-trade program under Title IV. Several utility companies argued
that EPA lacked authority to limit the Title IV allowances, either through a trading program, or by
requiring SIPs to include allowance-retirement provisions. Id. at 921. The court rejected EPA’s
purpose in streamlining the programs to prevent collapse of the Acid Rain cap and trade program:
“Although it may be reasonable . . . to consider the impact on the Title IV market, it does not
follow that EPA has the authority to remove allowances from that market.” Id. at 922. Similarly,
the court held that EPA cannot require all states to retire excess Title IV allowances, because EPA
has no authority to determine the methods employed by states if states are satisfying the standards
of section 110(a)(2)(D)(i)(I). Id.
225. North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896, 916–17 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
226. See id. at 917–18.
227. Id. at 917.
228. Id. at 917–18.
229. Id. at 918.
230. North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896, 918 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
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EPA’s use of cost to verify that sources could meet the percentage reduction in
emissions levels by utilizing highly cost-effective controls did not conform to
Michigan’s approval of using cost to determine a state’s significant
contribution.231 While in Michigan, the court allowed EPA to use costeffectiveness as a factor in determining each state’s significant contribution by
requiring the reductions of emissions that could be eliminated with costeffective controls, here, EPA established SO2 budgets by reducing the Title IV
allowances, and then determined that these reductions could be achieved with
cost-effective controls.232 This approach, according to the court, does not
“achieve something measurable towards the goal of prohibiting sources within
the state from contributing significantly to downwind nonattainment.”233
C. NOx Emissions Budgets
Although CAIR’s regional NOx emissions caps were evaluated using the
same cost-effective manner as the regional SO2 emissions budget,234
petitioners only challenged the state NOx emissions budgets,235 claiming
EPA’s use of a fuel-adjustment method to create more equitable budget
distribution was arbitrary and capricious.236 Petitioners argued that instead,
EPA should have assigned each state a budget equal to its unadjusted
proportion of NOx emissions.237

231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Although the regional NOx emissions budgets were not challenged in North Carolina v.
EPA, the court indicated that it considered CAIR’s regional NOx emissions budget arbitrary.
First, the court observed that the regional NOx emissions budget was evaluated in the same
manner as the regional SO2 budget, by “simply verifi[ng] sources could meet the SO2 caps with
controls EPA dubbed ‘highly cost-effective.’” Id. at 918. This approach was found by the court
to be arbitrary and capricious. Id. Second, the court noted that EPA’s NOx emissions rates were
based on a reduction of the NOx SIP Call rate: “It is not clear why EPA considered this rate a
useful starting point beyond the fact that such an emissions rate had been ‘considered in the
past.’” Id. at 919 (quoting Clean Air Interstate Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. 25,162, 25,205). Third, the
court noticed the lack of explanation surrounding CAIR’s NOx emissions rates as it related to
emissions that contribute to downwind nonattainment and asserted that “[a]s with the SO2 caps,
EPA did not draw the ‘significant contribution’ line on the basis of cost . . . or for that matter,
draw the significance line at all,” but simply evaluated the regional reduction to assure that it was
highly cost-effective. Id. at 919 (quoting Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d 633, 676–77 (D.C. Cir.
2000)). This use of cost was rejected in the court’s SO2 emissions budget analysis: “EPA can’t
just pick a cost for a region, and deem ‘significant’ any emissions that sources can eliminate more
cheaply.” Id. at 918.
235. North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d at 905.
236. Id. at 918–21.
237. Id. at 919. Because coal-fired EGU emissions are more costly to control than gas and oil
EGUs, CAIR provided a larger emissions budget to states with a greater number of coal-fired
EGUs. Thus, two states contributing an equal amount of SO2 emissions were not required to
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The court was troubled by EPA’s rebuttal that any method of allocating the
NOx cap would amount to equitable burden-sharing, because EPA analyzed
both the fuel-adjusted and unadjusted budgets on a region-wide basis, and,
therefore, even an unadjusted budget allocation would have no relation to the
significant contribution of each state.238 The court declared that even if
distribution of state budgets does not affect the total amount of region-wide
Section
emissions reductions, “that distribution is important.”239
110(a)(2)(D)(i)(I) requires a state to reduce its own significant contribution.240
In establishing state NOx emissions budgets solely based on fairness, EPA’s
approach contravenes section 110(a)(2)(D)(i)(I), as EPA has “no authority to
force an upwind state to share the burden of reducing other upwind state’s
emissions.”241 Having chosen not to evaluate emissions on a state-by-state
basis and potentially requiring a state to eliminate more than its significant
contribution, EPA could not put forth an adequate justification to the court.242
In vacating CAIR and its cap-and-trade programs, the North Carolina
court initially acknowledged that, in the absence of CAIR, the NOx SIP Call
trading program would continue, as it was terminated only as part of the CAIR
rulemaking.243 This decision was reconsidered, however, and the court
remanded CAIR without vacatur.244

reduce emissions equally; instead, the state with more gas and oil EGUs must reduce a greater
amount of emissions under its smaller budget than the state with coal-fired EGUs. See infra Part
III.B.
238. North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d at 920.
239. Id. at 920.
240. Id. at 921.
241. Id. In the NOx SIP Call, the EPA did not distinguish between two sources with equal
compliance costs, but with different impacts on downwind pollution; regardless of a state’s small
amount of emissions, once the EPA finds that it violates section 110(a)(2)(D), it must reduce its
significant contribution. Oren, supra note 1, at 208. But CAIR required equitable redistribution
of the NOx region-wide budget: if two states have an equal impact on downwind pollution, but
different costs of compliance, CAIR requires the state with lower costs to reduce greater amounts
of NOx emissions and thus be responsible for a larger portion of the regional reduction, therefore
“forc[ing] an upwind state to share the burden of reducing other upwind states’ emissions.”
North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896, 921 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
242. See North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d at 918–22.
243. Id. at 930. To quantify the amounts of emissions that contribute significantly to
nonattainment in CAIR, EPA adopted the formulation of factors with little conceptual difference
from EPA’s application of those same factors in the NOx SIP Call. Clean Air Interstate Rule, 70
Fed. Reg. at 25,174. This suggests serious uncertainty as to whether the NOx SIP Call cap-andtrade program could withstand the same challenges as the CAIR cap-and-trade programs.
Indeed, a year after the North Carolina decision, the D.C. Court of Appeals held that EPA
could not allow participation in the NOx SIP Call’s regional trading program to satisfy the Clean
Air Act requirement that nonattainment areas reduce emissions through adoption of reasonably
available control measures. Natural Resources Def. Council v. EPA, 571 F.3d 1245, 1256–58
(D.C. Cir. 2009). The court found the NOx SIP Call’s trading program was analogous to CAIR’s
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V. THE FUTURE OF CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAMS
A.

The Consequences of the North Carolina Decision

The North Carolina court distinguished its decision from Michigan by
noting that in Michigan, petitioners did not challenge the lawfulness of the
NOx SIP Call’s trading program.245 Whereas in Michigan, petitioners
contested only EPA’s methodology in determining each state’s significant
contribution, North Carolina addressed whether CAIR could guarantee
elimination of each state’s significant contribution given the existence of an
unrestricted cap-and-trade program.246 Despite Michigan’s approval of
emissions reductions that do not correlate directly with the actual air quality
impact of each state, North Carolina demanded that CAIR assure that some
measure of those eliminations will occur.247 Since CAIR’s cap-and-trade
programs did not focus on elimination of a state’s significant contribution, but
rather, were designed to eliminate the entire region’s significant contribution,
the North Carolina court did not find Michigan’s decision (largely upholding
the NOx SIP Call) controlling.248

regional approach, making “it impossible to tell whether the rule achieved a specific statutory
objective.” Id. at 1256. Applying similar reasoning, the court again emphasized that EPA had
not provided assurances that the NOx SIP Call’s cap-and-trade program would result in individual
state emissions reductions because EPA “has not evaluated the effect of the program on each
nonattainment area.” Id. at 1257. Even with evidence that regional emissions have been reduced,
EPA has not demonstrated that it can ensure emissions reductions within a particular area, nor has
EPA “considered the impact of the NOx SIP Call on the air quality within specific nonattainment
areas.” Id.
244. North Carolina v. EPA, 550 F.3d 1176 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
245. North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896, 908 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“In Michigan we never
passed on the lawfulness of the NOx SIP Call’s trading program.”); Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d at
676 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“Of course we are able to assume the existence of EPA’s allowance trading
program only because no one has challenged its adoption.”).
246. See North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d at 908.
247. Id.
248. See Clean Air Interstate Act, 70 Fed. Reg. at 25,183. The Michigan and North Carolina
decisions may also have been influenced by the types of petitioners challenging each respective
rule. Oren, supra note 1, at 211. In Michigan, EPA received support from various environmental
groups and states that would benefit from emissions reductions, while industrial groups, labor
organizations, and the regulated states challenged EPA’s cost-efficient reductions. Id. The
Michigan court indicated its belief that the challenge to EPA’s use of cost consideration was
motivated by a purpose to prevent EPA from regulating: “[T]he gamble—at least of the small
contributors—is evidently that if EPA were barred from considering costs, it would never have
included such states.” Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d at 675. Whereas previously, these groups had
not hesitated in supporting cost-efficient reductions, their challenge to the NOx SIP Call, seemed
insincere. See Oren, supra note 1, at 211. Professor Oren had predicted after the Michigan
decision that “[i]t might well be that the D.C. Circuit would decide otherwise in a challenge
brought by environmental groups claiming that EPA was not going far enough in regulation.” Id.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

668

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 54:635

Ultimately, the North Carolina decision limits the EPA’s seemingly
expanded authority after Michigan, with devastating consequences to the
environment. Although the North Carolina court did not explicitly hold that
EPA lacked authority to create an interstate emissions trading program, there is
little EPA can do to guarantee that states will eliminate their significant
contributions if its regulatory program includes interstate emissions trading.249
While EPA may be able to provide the state-by-state, upwind-downwind
measurement demanded by the North Carolina court, the difficulty lies in the
“assurances” that the court demands.250 Since an unrestricted interstate
emissions trading program allows sources within a state to acquire additional
emissions allowances from out of state sources, the total emissions from a state
may potentially exceed its emissions budget.251 Thus, EPA could not
guarantee that a state would reduce its significant contribution under an
interstate emissions trading program.252 By failing to require elimination of
state significant contributions, EPA’s rule gives no effect to section
110(a)(2)(D), requiring these eliminations, and EPA lacks any statutory
authority to promulgate a cap-and-trade program.253
If EPA has no statutory authority to create interstate emissions trading
programs, emissions reductions in future EPA regulation may not be as
substantial.254 The primary environmental benefit of cap-and-trade programs

Indeed, in North Carolina, the state petitioners challenged the lawfulness of EPA’s trading
programs based on CAIR’s failure to assure relief to downwind nonattainment areas and basically
argued for more stringent regulation. Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 201, at 29–33. And, although
the majority of petitioners challenging CAIR’s emissions reductions were industrial groups, they
did not challenge EPA’s consideration of cost-effective measures. Joint Reply Brief of Entergy
Corporation and FPL Group, Inc. as to Fuel Adjustment Issues at 2–4, North Carolina v. EPA,
531 F.3d 896 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (No. 05-1244).
249. See Clean Air Interstate Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. at 25,231.
250. In a subsequent decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
did emphasize that EPA may be able to reinstate the NOx SIP Call’s cap-and-trade program, “if,
upon conducting a technical analysis, it finds the NOx SIP Call results in greater emissions
reductions in a nonattainment area than would be achieved” by the Clean Air Act’s minimum
requirement of reductions through the adoption of reasonably available control measures. Natural
Resources Def. Council v. EPA, 571 F.3d 1245, 1258 (D.C. Cir. 2009). Although the modeling
EPA relied on in developing the NOx SIP Call ten years ago could not signify the upwind–
downwind linkage, the present availability of such modeling is not known.
251. See Clean Air Interstate Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. at 25,230–31.
252. Moreover, restricting the program to permit trading exclusively between in-state sources
would not reduce costs to industry as significantly as an interstate cap-and-trade program. See
Clean Air Interstate Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. at 25,196.
253. North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896, 908 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
254. McLean statement, supra note 8 (“While the court disagrees with how we employed the
cap-and-trade approach in CAIR, cap-and-trade has been an extremely effective mechanism
delivering broad reductions and certainty that a specific emission level is achieved . . . and
dramatic human health and environmental benefits. Losing such programs means losing
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is their guarantee of major reductions in pollutant emissions, as emissions are
permanently capped well below baseline levels.255 EPA’s regional approach to
CAIR was premised on the fact that more emissions could be eliminated in a
cost-effective manner if state participation in the model cap-and-trade program
was assumed.256 Considering the emphasis Congress has placed upon
pollution controls that are cost-efficient to industry257 and previous EPA action
that has also endorsed this priority,258 cost considerations will remain a
significant aspect in EPA’s air pollution regulation. Without a cap-and-trade
program, the costs associated with pollution control will undeniably be higher,
resulting in less cost-effective emissions reductions, and hence, lesser
emissions reductions.259 This outcome would impact air quality throughout the
region,260 and subvert the purpose of the North Carolina decision to assure
elimination of emissions that contribute significantly to downwind
nonattainment.
In practice, potential challengers may not pursue North Carolina’s
interpretation of section 110(a)(2)(D) as precluding EPA’s authority to
implement interstate emissions trading programs through future judicial
review, considering the universal acceptance and widespread benefit of capand-trade programs.261 For example, the North Carolina petitioners’ challenge
to CAIR’s cap-and-trade programs concerned the lack of restrictions on
emissions trading, not the use of trading programs or EPA’s authority to create

assurances that reductions will be made in a timely manner by sources responsible for
environmental problems. This may also make environmental protection more expensive and thus
more difficult to achieve.”).
255. Swift, supra note 73, at 4.
256. See Clean Air Interstate Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. at 25,196.
257. See McCubbin, supra note 20, at 59–60.
258. See Clean Air Interstate Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. 25,166 (“EPA’s CAIR and the previously
promulgated NOx SIP Call . . . are not designed to eliminate all contributions to transport, but
rather to balance the [economic] burden for achieving attainment between regional-scale and
local-scale control programs.”).
259. To illustrate, in both the NOx SIP Call and CAIR, EPA ascertained a particular level of
cost associated with pollution control, based on the costs of previous regulation. See Ozone
Transport Assessment Group, 63 Fed. Reg. 57,400; Clean Air Interstate Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. at
25,175. EPA only required reductions of those emissions from control measures that could be
eliminated at a cost equal to or lower than that amount, assuming use of highly cost-effective
controls and participation in cap-and-trade programs. Because the costs would be higher without
participation in a cap-and-trade program, not as many types of control measures would be able to
reduce emissions at a cost equal to or lower than that ascertained by EPA. Thus, emissions from
a lesser amount of control measures would be eliminated, resulting in lower emissions reductions.
260. See supra notes 119–21 and accompanying text. EPA has consistently maintained that
PM2.5 and ozone nonattainment are caused by many sources in a broad region, and, therefore,
may be solved only by controlling sources throughout the region. Clean Air Interstate Rule, 70
Fed. Reg. at 25,175.
261. See, e.g., supra notes 56–60.
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such programs.262 In its brief, North Carolina implied that limitations in the
form of restricted use of banked allowances would suffice.263 While the North
Carolina opinion suggests that this type of restriction would be insufficient to
effect the statutory mandate of section 110(a)(2)(D),264 petitioner’s request
demonstrates the relative lack of adversaries to the emissions trading system.
As well, when faced with significant pressure from industrial,
environmental, and political support for cap-and-trade programs, the court may
attempt to alleviate the harshness of its apparent ruling in North Carolina.265
Further, not considered by the court was the possibility that once CAIR’s
regional reductions occurred, and downwind areas were in attainment of PM2.5
and ozone NAAQS, there would be no grounds to petition EPA under section
126(b) or contest EPA’s regulation under section 110(a)(2)(D).266 This
consequence may provide another approach for the court to assuage a strict
interpretation of the North Carolina holding. Regardless, the implications of
North Carolina must be resolved, as alternative means to implementation of
interstate emissions trading programs are limited.
B.

Alternative Sources of Authority to Create Cap-and-Trade Programs
1.

Interstate Transport Regions and Commissions

Despite the North Carolina decision, “use of the proven cap and trade
approach”267 will certainly be a significant aspect of any future regulation
pertaining to air pollution. Section 176A of the Clean Air Act could be a
source for the creation of interstate emissions programs.268 Under section 176,
EPA may act at its own discretion, or upon petition by a state, to establish an
interstate transport region if EPA has reason to believe that the interstate
transport of air pollutants from one or more states contributes significantly to a

262. Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 201, at 33.
263. Id. at i (“In the NOx SIP Call, EPA included limitations to ensure that budgets would not
be significantly compromised by ‘excessive use’ of banked allowances. 63 Fed. Reg. at 57,431/3.
This provided ‘security to downwind areas that banking will not significantly increase emissions
above budgeted levels.’ . . . In CAIR EPA provides no assurance that trading will not result in
overages greater than the de minimis ten percent level of the NOx SIP Call.”).
264. See supra note 203. Even restrictions on banking allowances could not guarantee
elimination of a state’s significant contribution, as sources are not prevented from obtaining
additional allowances from out-of-state sources.
265. In a 2009 decision, Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, the D.C. Court of
Appeals noted that the NOx SIP Call’s cap-and-trade program may be reinstated if EPA properly
evaluates the effect of the program on nonattainment areas. 571 F.3d 1245, 1256–58 (D.C. Cir.
2009).
266. See Clean Air Interstate Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. at 25,175; 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D) (2006).
267. McLean statement, supra note 8.
268. 42 U.S.C. § 7506a.
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violation of the NAAQS within the region.269 Once an interstate transport
region is established, a transport commission is created, comprised of EPA
administrator (or his designee), the Governor of each state in the region (or his
designee), an air pollution control official from each State in the region, and
members from EPA Regional Offices of affected regions.270 To date, several
regions have either succeeded in forming a coalition or are currently in the
process of developing cap-and-trade systems.271
The interstate transport commission is responsible for assessing the degree
of interstate transport throughout the region, evaluating strategies for
mitigating the interstate pollution, and recommending measures to ensure that
the member states have SIPs in place that meet the requirements of section
110(a)(2)(D).272 The commission may also request that EPA issue a finding
under section 110(k)(5) that a SIP of one of the states in the region is
substantially inadequate to meet the requirements of section 110(a)(2)(D).273
Interstate transport commissions, however, are limited because they do not
have authority to require implementation of their recommendations by states or
EPA.274 So even upon the commission’s recommendation of a cap-and-trade
program as a means to reduce interstate air pollution, EPA must still
promulgate regulation to put it into effect. And, although EPA may adopt a
commission’s recommendations, the likelihood of judicial review following
any EPA rulemaking affords an uneasy reliance on this system and detracts
from the effectiveness of the commission.275
2.

New Legislation

Conceptually, CAIR did address the goal of section 110(A)(2)(D)(i), which
sought to prevent out-of-state emissions from hindering the efforts of a state in
attaining NAAQS for a particular pollutant, although as a region-wide effort.276
EPA’s research indicated that, typically, two or more states contribute
transported pollution to a single downward area, so that their collective
contribution is responsible for the downwind nonattainment.277 Thus, the
nature of interstate transport of certain air pollutants suggests that a reduction
of emissions throughout the region is an effective means of preventing
nonattainment in downwind states.278 Nevertheless, section 110(a)(2)(D)
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.

42 U.S.C. § 7506a(a).
42 U.S.C. § 7506a(b)(1).
Doremus & Hanemann, supra note 73, at 804.
42 U.S.C. § 7506a(b)(2).
Id. § 7506a(c).
Caplan, supra note 41, at 192.
Id. at 192–95.
See Clean Air Interstate Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. 25,162.
See id. at 25,186.
See id.
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seems to direct a particular method of obtaining this goal—providing that each
state eliminates its individual significant contribution, not the entire region.279
In order to provide EPA with more flexible authority, the Clean Air Act must
be amended.
One way for the legislature to address this problem is by reforming the
Clean Air Act to provide EPA with explicit authority to create cap-and-trade
programs. As North Carolina v. EPA suggests, the Clean Air Act is not likely
to support EPA’s regional approach to emissions reductions without the
express authorization of such a program by Congress.280 Although several
pollutants are susceptible to transport across jurisdictional boundaries, the
Clean Air Act was drafted to deal with air pollution as a local problem and has
been relatively ineffectual in controlling the regional effects of interstate air
pollution transport.281 Likewise, because the structure of an interstate cap-andtrade program involves the efforts of several states to achieve regional
emissions reductions, additional statutory authority recognizing this regional
approach to interstate air pollution transport control is necessary. Although
Congress questioned EPA’s authority in this area in the past, it has failed to
modify the Clean Air Act.282 With the North Carolina holding, Congress may
now be forced to take such action.

279. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D) (2006).
280. A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1990, at 3389–90
(“Although there are precedents for emission trading under the existing Clean Air Act, a
nationwide trading program is a major regulatory innovation. Historically, most legislative
‘command and control’ proposals would have allocated requirements to the States, which in turn
would have allocated reductions to power plants. [The Acid Rain SO2 trading program] assigns
tradable allowances directly to the utilities which own the units at power plants.”).
281. Brown, supra note 49, at 925. “When the CAA was first drafted, the primary concern
was with pollutants such as carbon monoxide (‘CO’) and sulfur dioxide (‘SO2’). These pollutants
were seen as static. It was not until the late eighties that the Bush Administration—after much
resistance—conceded that SO2 was subject to transport and casually linked to acid rain.” Id. at
n.5.
282. In the first Clean Air Act reauthorization hearing, EPA requested the following change
to be made to the Clean Air Act: “Providing clearer authority for EPA to develop and directly
implement multi-State solutions, such as cap-and-trade programs, for regional air pollution
problems caused by any pollutant.” Hearing before the Subcommittee on Clean Air, Wetlands,
Private Property, and Nuclear Safety, 106th Cong. 75 (1999) (statement of Robert Perciasepe,
Assistant Administrator, Office of Air and Radiation, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency).
In a 1999 Senate appropriations hearing, EPA prepared a legal opinion that discussed
its authority to implement cap and trade programs, concluding: “The specific provisions
of the Clean Air Act that are potentially applicable to control emissions of the pollutants
discussed here can largely be categorized as provisions related to either state programs . . .
or national regulation. . . . None of these provisions easily lends itself to establishing
market-based national or regional emissions cap-and-trade programs.
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Congress may also enact legislation for a statutorily created cap-and-trade
program, and provide EPA with the authority to regulate it. By enacting the
Acid Rain program, which specifically prescribed a solution to the problem of
interstate air pollution through market-based emissions trading, Congress has
demonstrated that it is capable of the precision essential in creating an
emissions cap-and-trade program.283 But implementation of an interstate
emissions trading program upon EPA’s own initiative, after North Carolina,
would require even greater legislative action.
CONCLUSION
The problem of interstate air pollution transport is generally accepted as a
situation in which federal intervention is required, but also an area the Clean
Air Act has failed to fully address.284 Lacking authority to create cap-andtrade programs under the Clean Air Act, EPA loses a powerful and effective
weapon in controlling interstate air pollution transport and improving air
quality. Ultimately, the consequences of North Carolina will leave EPA,
industry, and the public waiting for Congressional action.
KATI KIEFER

The Clean Air Act provisions relating to state programs do not authorize EPA to
require states to control air pollution through economically efficient cap-and-trade
programs and do not provide full authority for EPA to impose such programs.”
Hearing Before a Subcomm. of the Committee on Appropriations, United States Senate, 105th
Cong. 211–214 (1999) (statement of Jonathan Z. Cannon, General Counsel, to Carol M.
Browner, Administrator).
283. Caplan, supra note 41, at 203–08.
284. Oren, supra note 1, at 204 (“[T]he Clean Air Act’s interstate pollution provisions have
not worked well.”).
 J.D. 2009, Saint Louis University School of Law. Foremost, I must thank Prof. Douglas R.
Williams for tirelessly advising me through this process and sharing his extensive knowledge. I
would also like to thank my family, Gary, Rosemary, and Courtney, for their support, Chris for
his patience and encouragement, and Danielle and Beth for their guidance and perspective.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

674

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 54:635

